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Ordinary memory knows it so well that it sings, in all languages, o f the sweetness 
o f one’s “home, sweet home.” Yet, the enclosed garden where the body hides its 
pains and joys is not a “forbidden city.” If it does not want to become a synonym 
for a terrible house arrest, separated from the living, the private space must know 
how to open itself up to the flow o f  people coming in and out, to be the passage­
way for a continual circulation, where objects, people, words, and ideas cross 
paths; for life is also about mobility, impatience for change, and relation to a 
plurality o f  others. Only a dead language no longer changes; only the absence o f all 
residents respects the immovable order o f things. Life maintains and displaces; it 
wears out, breaks, and reworks; it creates new configurations o f beings and objects 
across the everyday practices o f the living, always similar and different. Private 
space is this ideal city in which all the passersby have beloved faces, whose streets 
are familiar and safe, whose interior architecture is changeable almost at will.
— Michel de Certeau and Luce Giard, The Practice o f  Everyday Life, vol. 2
Home Sweet Home
While imaginations of dwelling cannot but proliferate unpredictably, these pages 
begin with a more paranoid tale about “privates”—the oft-imagined private domain
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of the detached single-family variety of American home sweet homes and the so- 
called private territory of the self, of personhood. In the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, both spaces converged in an unequivocally suburban form of 
American individualism that not only impacted material forms of dwelling along 
residential landscapes, but substantially limited so-called “proper” affective and 
sexual life to the insides of house-bound nuclear familial units, while it forcefully 
kept other kinds of connections and identifications out.
Of course, I am here reiterating an ideal—the model home and incubator of 
nuclear families and model citizens, of personal happiness and domestic content— 
not to prove it illusory, but to grapple with its very real hold over so much of 
everyday life. As Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner have pointed out with re­
spect to heterosexual norms of intimacy, the normal “may never have been an 
accurate description of how people actually lived” (323). And yet, “this structural 
relation is no less normative for being imperfect in practice. Its force is to prevent 
the recognition, memory, elaboration or institutionalization of all the nonstandard 
intimacies that people have in everyday life” (324). June Howard similarly explains 
that even though “the home is no haven,” even though its walls are exposed as 
more and more permeable at every turn, even though the boundaries between 
private and public are “divisions that can never divide,” “that does not stop them 
from having effects. They project bounded entities, set the terms of connected­
ness, and are woven together in circuits of reciprocally stabilized instabilities with 
real consequences” (9-10).
Few deny that the dream falls short, that sometimes (if not most of the time) 
this home sweet home isn’t all it’s cracked up to be. But the majority hesitates to 
classify the problem as foundational if they call it a problem at all. That is to say, 
the ideal still performs regulatory and disciplinary functions: a wide range of exist­
ing familial formations are largely defined in relation to it. And if they fail, they are 
damned as dysfunctional—held individually responsible for instability—because 
they failed to follow the rules. This inquiry emerges from a nagging suspicion that 
the less desirable dimensions of suburban privatized domesticity have such stay- 
ing-power, because they are so intimately and invisibly tied to theories of subjec­
tivity, to self-concepts, to the form and shape people believe themselves to take. At 
the turn of the twentieth century', architect Michael Sorkin so aptly explains, the 
home gathered considerable ideological force “as the preserve of the personal, the 
terrain of our individuation” (193).
With roots extending back to at least the Renaissance, the notion of the house 
as a domain for the articulation and construction of the private self is obviously not 
just a twentieth century development. But acute transformations of common-place 
principles of privacy did occur in the 191 Os and 1920s with the emergence of, among 
other things, new technologies of publicity; a legal definition of personhood as 
private property; the popularization of psychological discourses about the self; the 
beginnings of suburbanization; and the growing strength of market mechanisms 
designed to elicit and sustain specific attachments to home across product packag­
ing, magazine serials, and billboards. Through my research into archives and histo­
ries of architecture, urban studies, and popular culture and my encounters with
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literary fictions of home-life, I have become convinced that a particularly cozy 
relationship between the architectural domestic and a theory of subjectivity as, 
precisely, privatized enclosure gathered a conspicuous amount of energy at this 
time. In house planning and interior decorating manuals from the 1920s, they were 
analogously modeled and also equated—thereby the house was understood to 
express the self 1 In itself, the conflation provides no necessary cause for social 
criticism. But when the dwelling-model gravitates toward one singular form that 
has dominated the production and consumption of such a vast portion of American 
culture (housing, novels, furnishings, films, etc.), drastically limiting imaginations 
of alternative material and social forms of dwelling, then the alignments between 
the domestic and the self could stand some serious renovations.
Consider a passage from a 1916 article about “the pleasant adventures of home 
making” in one of the popular architecture and interior decorating periodicals, The 
Craftsman:
Houses are recorders o f experience, vouchers o f taste or the lack o f it. A man’s 
thumb-prints upon paper have no more convincing a variation of individuality 
than the house he elects to build upon the lot o f his choice. The bumps and 
depressions o f a man’s head are no more an indication o f his character than the 
windows, porches, roof and doors o f his house— were there some new species o f  
phrenologist to interpret them. (“The Story o f Home-Making” 216)
If here the house signifies (literally standing in for) the occupant, the individuality 
of said occupant emerges from an empty lot. The house takes shape from scratch; 
it has no history, or neighbors for that matter, to speak of. Individuality is self- 
made upon a blank slate and only then engaged and interpreted. “A distinct domi­
cile is, indeed, something worth fighting for,” as Sorkin argues, in the sense that 
every single person on earth deserves a home (198). And fair enough is Frank 
Lloyd Wright’s 1908 pronouncement that “[o]ur ideal is Democracy, the highest 
possible expression of the individual as a unit not inconsistent with a harmonious 
whole” (“Cause: First Paper” 13). It is his more melodramatic restatement of the 
idea in his second lecture six years later that should raise some eyebrows: “A great 
Democracy is the highest form of Aristocracy conceivable, not of birth or place of 
wealth, but of those qualities that give distinction to the man as a man, and that as 
a social state it must be characterized by the honesty and responsibility of the 
absolute individualist as the unit of its structure, then only can we have an Art 
worthy the name” (“Cause: Second Paper” 42). In a world where the “absolute 
individualist” is the fundamental unit upon which the social order is built, there is 
no foundational sense of shared space or collective subjectivities, no room for the 
very basic idea that my conception of myself as a person comes through my inter­
actions with and compassion for people around me.
If both self and home were conceived as autonomous and detached, they were 
also ubiquitously prescribed (by social reformers, real estate people, pop-psy- 
chologists, and others) as privatized dwellings positioned against the social world, 
defensive preserves of the personal. Certainly, as another piece in The Craftsman 
expresses, what sometimes makes a house a home is precisely its relative differ­
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ence from a world “out there”; it should be “a place of constant enjoyment, a refuge 
from useless annoyance, a place of rest and realization of interests . . .  a restorer of 
life and interests, not a drain upon it” (“Small Houses With a Sense of Space” 313). 
A haven in an occasionally heartless world needs to lock its doors in certain circum­
stances. But the political and commercial forces behind American households are 
all too often in the business of restoring certain lives and interests and draining the 
resources from others.2
The following pages interrogate and expand upon Sorkin’s conception of the 
home as a defensive preserve of the personal that structures and is structured by a 
strong theory of the person as a privatized, free-standing, owner/container of emo­
tions and sexuality. In their imaginations and prescriptions of a good society, ar­
chitects, urban planners, educators, politicians, women’s clubs, and popular peri­
odicals alike equated individuality, independence, and moral virtue with an over­
whelmingly suburban conception of private space. They prescribed and legislated 
inner-directed dwelling practices at the scale of the house, a detached domestic 
space hermetically sealed from the marketplace, and at the scale of the individual 
subject, a bound and psychologized interiority. Inside both properly ordered houses 
and bodies, proper sexuality aligned with romantic intimacy that was heterosexual, 
coupled, and maintained inside, as a kind of private property. To be a good citizen 
of a stable nation, it was assumed (and arguably still is) across large sections of 
built, textual, and visual worlds, one must inhabit an autonomous, detached unit 
with identifiable boundaries that at once announce its contents to the social world 
and seal, stabilize, and defend them from it.
The considerable force of these movements inward at the level of housing and 
subjectivity across architectural and fictional landscapes needs to be confronted, 
but not fixed or even centralized, in any analysis of early twentieth-century dwell­
ing patterns. I use the language of boundary formation, because I am looking 
closely at the way that residential lines in social space intersect with conceptual 
and corporeal grids of subjectivity. “Privates” refer to the discursive and non- 
discursive stabilizations of a particularly strong model of domestic interiority that 
nevertheless makes up only one, albeit very visible, dimension of a far more compli­
cated American landscape. “Proper” homes and bodies were interiorized as social 
subjects became more mobile across all sorts of borders, as languages diversified 
and literatures exploded, as social spaces were constituted by visibly conflicting 
value systems. In the 1920s, floods of immigrants were crossing the nation’s bor­
ders. Fights for women’s rights became increasingly visible. More and more women 
entered work spaces formerly dominated by men. Divorce rates were on the rise 
and so was a growing diversity of family types. And sex was commercialized in 
ways it never had been before. Andrea Friedman explains that only with the emer­
gence of motion pictures, plays, and burlesque shows in the first half of the twen­
tieth century was sexual diversity writ large on the social stage and screen; sexual 
commodification, in other words, exploded across a range of classes and tastes:
Commercial sex was not limited to the expansion o f prostitution. Concert sa­
loons, dance halls, and restaurants all offered public spaces for expressing sexual
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desire and for arranging extramarital liaisons. Images o f  nude or seminude women 
could be purchased at cigar stores, were displayed in saloons and pool halls, and 
could be found in national media like the Police Gazette. Even marital sexuality 
was drawn into the commercialization o f sex, as married women perused adver­
tisements for contraceptives and “female remedies” and availed themselves o f the 
services o f professional abortionists. (18)3
In response to increasing commercialization, emerging technologies of publicity, 
and altogether new public spheres which challenged existing boundaries around 
class, ethnicity, and geography, privacy emerged as a self-conscious principle and 
the boundaries around certain familial enclosures and bodies became more defen­
sive. If interiority was held up as an ideal, in other words, it was because outsides 
were felt more intensely.
It is precisely at the edges, then, and not the center of domestic enclaves, 
where one can begin to analyze textual and material efforts to manage and map 
threatening social landscapes. It is here also where one might begin to understand 
that the enclosures produced are tenuous, riddled with fissures and broken seams; 
borders are crossed all the time; and what Berlant and Warner describe as the queer 
world—“a space of entrances, exits, unsystematized lines of acquaintances, incom­
mensurate geographies”—may, as it turns out, be the one most of us actually 
inhabit (322).4 And yet, for some reason, beliefs in boundaries separating the home 
from the rest of the world or some kind of “real” self from the social persist. Expos­
ing them as blurry may constitute only a portion of the intellectual labor necessary 
for their rearrangement.
In its very form, this essay aims to pull prevailing assumptions about so-called 
private dwellings and selfhoods away from certain polarities and dead-ends and 
into a field of greater complexities and opportunities. Sections one and two map 
the “suburban privates” of households and subjects so that the third section may go 
about imagining alternative interior architectures, counterprivate frameworks for 
“feeling at home.”
One: Households
To the Blackburns (a family with mom dad daughter son and dog):
Herewith the plans for a good time space for your family in a style to which you 
are, as yet, unaccustomed but one which you might truly call your own if you 
wanted to. We call the style Usonian meaning ‘o f these United States’... Space is 
characteristic o f this free pattern for a freer life than you could possibly live in the 
conventional house -  separated into boxes; itself a big box... We have studied your 
little family and arranged for all including the dog. Each has his own privacy when 
needed and good time space for all together... Betty Jane has a telephone box and 
all the privacy by the fireplace in the sitting room any young girl has a right to 
expect before she owns her own home -  or her own car. The boys meantime have 
plenty of room for action... Mother has a convenient kitchen next the dining table
-  everything ‘on ballbearings’ to save labor. It is all but autoa right to expect before 
she owns her own home— or her own car. The boys meantime have plenty of  
room for action . . . .  Mother has a convenient kitchen next to the dining table—
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everything “on ballbearings” to save labor. It is all but automatic. Father’s office 
is next so mother can answer the telephone when he is away. There is plenty of car 
space . . . .  American family life is unlike any other in the world and I think this 
plan recognizes it for pretty much what it is— at this stage o f  development— a 
little private club— with special privacies, ultra conveniences, and style all the 
while.
— Frank Lloyd Wright5
In his foreword to the 1923 government publication How to Own Your Home: A 
Handbook for Prospective Homeowners, Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce under the Harding and the Coolidge administrations, 
wrote:
Maintaining a high percentage o f individual homeowners is one o f the searching 
tests that now challenge the people o f the United States. The present large 
proportion o f families that own their own homes is both the foundation o f a sound 
economic and social system and a guarantee that our society will continue to 
develop rationally as changing conditions demand, (v)
After World War I, but before the emergence of mass suburbanization in the likes of 
Levittown, Hoover motivated a massive political, economic, social, and commercial 
campaign for individual homeownership. And the ideal American home, a de­
tached, supposedly secure and self-sufficient technological unit, was reproduced 
in massive quantities to serve as both a foundation for and a shield from a rapidly 
changing social order.6 The 1920 census classified the majority of Americans as 
either suburban or urban for the first time. Throughout the 1920s, the population of 
suburbs increased at twice the rate as the population of cities, and the suburban 
market tripled between 1920 and 1922 (Wright, Building the Dream 195,199).
Gwendolyn Wright points out that “most popular middle-class literature, hous­
ing guides, and even architects’ manuals and government documents praised the 
suburbs as the haven o f ‘normalcy’” (196). At this time, to be normal, wholesome, 
and happy was to be ensconced in an isolated sphere of domesticity. While, as 
common history has it, the divisions between private and public zones within the 
domestic household became more flexible (with the appearance of new spaces like 
the common living room, for example), the identity of the household as a whole 
seemed to solidify as a private reserve. A stable home, Hoover insisted as Secretary 
and eventually as President of the United States, served as the foundation for good 
citizenship. The proper family of good citizens was accordingly granted a privi­
leged place at the center of a healthy nation, but was both functionally and spatially 
separated from the rest of society. Increasingly into the 1920s, the family’s function 
was framed as personal as opposed to political. If the home was taking care of any 
business, it was doing so behind closed doors, fa9ades of intimacy separating the 
personal social relationships of everyday life from political, economic, and state 
concerns.
Although zoning restrictions against noise and pollution predated the twenti­
eth century, zoning laws became the norm only in the 191 Os and ‘20s, regulating the 
lay of the land and framing the divisions between residential and commercial or
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industrial areas as “natural.”7 Anti-urban federal housing programs proliferated, 
preaching that the livability of residential communities depended on their being 
precisely distinct from cityscapes considered dangerous to physical and mental 
health. The aforementioned government publication, How to Own Your Home, 
directed its readers to insulate their homes from everything but domestic life:
If a city is zoned it is almost always safest to buy in a residential district where 
there is safety from intrusion by factories, public garages, and scattered stores...
If there is no zoning law, how about private restrictions?... If even one or two lots 
near by are unrestricted, objectionable buildings might be erected on them... Are 
the private restrictions such that a home will surely be protected? (Gries and 
Taylor 11)
Homeownership guides were published to educate the public as to proper ways of 
living but also to sell these residential arrangements. With the Hoover administra­
tion, there emerged an extremely widespread and successful housing business. An 
open letter from John M. Gries, the Chief of the Division of Building and Housing at 
the Department of Commerce and one of the authors of How to Own Your Home, 
placed inside the front cover of the guide reads: “It is our belief that if home 
ownership is to increase and become a basis for a progressive citizenship, the home 
seeker should have sound financing machinery available, that his investment should 
be as free as possible from unnecessary hazards and that he should be given in 
general a reasonable opportunity to attain his purpose.” In 1908, Sears Roebuck, 
acting as mortgage bank, architect, contractor, and builder all in one, started selling 
small, relatively low-cost houses (“Mass-produced Houses” 54). By the 1920s, in 
conjunction with the emergence of the automobile (which Hoover calls the “great 
impulse to suburban life” [v]), the government and the housing industry massively 
coordinated their efforts to move people out into planned suburbs, and the mid- 
1920s witnessed an enormous boom in the production of single-family homes.8 The 
house became an object to be bought, sold, and reproduced in the marketplace.
Not only was the domestic marketed, but it also became a target market itself. 
According to urban and architectural historian Dolores Hayden, for example, 
“[advertising and marketing firms spent 1 billion dollars to promote private domes­
tic life and mass consumption in 1920; their annual volume had risen over 1,000 
percent since 1890 and continued to rise throughout the 1920s” (274). Ironically, 
the media for this marketing campaign (such as the radio) continually permeated the 
boundaries of the house. In other words, it is precisely as the envelope of the 
house became more explicitly vulnerable to the forces of the market that those same 
market forces, in cooperation with politicians, social reformers, urban planners, and 
architects, circulated the ideology of a free-standing, impermeable domestic interi­
ority.
Early twentieth-century prescriptive literature, home-making and -decorating 
manuals and periodicals, and architectural manifestos continued to frame domestic 
architecture as a strong determinant of behavior and values, but they shifted away 
from the nineteenth-century emphasis upon moral patterns of living toward a much 
more individualist agenda promoting honest personality and character over fleet­
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ing and transitory forms. As that which formally marked the border between inside 
and outside, the domestic enclosure’s fa$ade became more and more critical to the 
proper functioning of home-life and was judged according to its honesty—whether 
it genuinely and accurately communicated or translated its inner purpose. The 
outward appearance of the home, in other words, was required to designate, ex­
press, authenticate that which it contained—the private life of an American family 
of free citizens. For Frank Lloyd Wright, for example, the house functioned not 
merely to signify, but somehow to authenticate the individuality of its occupant— 
to “idealize the character of the individual it is fashioned to serve more intimately” 
(“Cause: First Paper” 21,24). Accordingly, he argued, “[t]here should be as many 
kinds (styles) of house as there are kinds (styles) of people and individuals” (10-
11 ).9 Because it operated as an external indicator of interiority, the honest domestic 
fa$ade had to look different from public architecture in order to express hominess.10 
To put it another way, the fagade indicated the separateness of home from the 
outside on the outside. By the second decade, there was a growing opposition to 
the use of industrial-looking elements to build homes:
Claiming] that the traditional building materials were those best adapted to the 
rooted, solid institution o f the house, and that the chief materials o f mass produc­
tion— metals, fabrics, and plastics— would be ill-adapted to housing,. . .  the foes 
of fabrication deposed that a man’s home is wreathed in sentiment as is no other 
inanimate object. (“Mass-produced Houses” 52)
Although Sears Roebuck led the way in pre-fabrication, their manufactured domes­
tic spaces, designed to appear “homey” and precisely not part of the business 
world, “neatly stylized in the suburban manner with accents of Colonial New En­
gland,” clearly reflect these general sentiments (“Mass-produced Houses” 54). 
Today, developers continue to make a whole lot of money mass-producing the 
“faces” of suburban privates, feeding a growing desire for the images of quaint 
communities and picket fences.11
Two: Subjects
In his own home thus the Broadacre citizen would be not only impregnable. He 
would be inviolate. This nation indestructible! . . . .  H ew  his country.
— Frank Lloyd Wright
The socio-economic and affective orders that materialized through the built envi­
ronment in the early twentieth century applied in remarkably similar ways to the 
self. “A free America, democratic in the sense that our forefathers intended it to be,
means just this individual freedom for a ll. . .  freedom in space___The home of the
individual social unit will contain in itself in this respect all the city heretofore could 
afford, plus intimate comfort and free individual choice” (Wright, “Modem Archi­
tecture” 74, 76). Frank Lloyd Wright’s prolific declarations about privacy and 
individual liberty could be found everywhere in his many lectures and books, as 
well as in the pages of popular women’s periodicals like Ladies Home Journal. “It
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is the essence of Democracy that the individual man is free in his body and free in
his soul---- It is the ideal of Democracy that the individual man should stand self-
centered, self-governing—an individual sovereign, an individual god,” his early 
employer and mentor, Louis Sullivan, wrote (141). Wright and Sullivan render a 
free-standing, self-governing sphere of individuality that is the privatized liberal 
subject par excellence. It is the theoretically autonomous figure who inhabits a 
landscape of impossibly distinct boundaries between the public and the political, 
on the one hand, and an interiorized private on the other. It is the subject for whom 
much American legal and political theory and practice is based and according to 
whom so many dimensions of American social and personal space are imagined and 
materialized, and it gained considerably strong currency in the 1910s and 1920s. 
The outer shape and the substance of this subject, so it goes, remains universally 
the same on the face of American politics. Each to an acre.12 And the personal, the 
peculiar, the idiosyncratic mingle happily together inside property lines.
So much more than a privilege, privacy became an individual right prerequisite 
to a healthy national body. This wasn’t always the case. Privacy used to have a 
privative trait, according to Hannah Arendt:
It meant literally a state o f being deprived o f something, and even o f the highest 
and most human o f man’s capacities. A man who lived only a private life, who like 
the slave was not permitted to enter the public realm, or like the barbarian had 
chosen not to establish such a realm, was not fully human. We no longer think 
primarily o f deprivation when we use the word “privacy,” and this is partly due 
to the enormous enrichment o f the private sphere through modem individualism 
(38).
At the turn of the twentieth century, the private enclosures of modem individualism 
so enriched at the expense of the public also demanded legal protection from the 
public. It was only in 1890, with Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren’s Harvard 
Law Review article entitled “The Right to Privacy,” that a principle of privacy was 
legally established to regulate and discipline traffic around, into, and through pri­
vate spheres. In his extremely informative historical review of the right to privacy, 
William L. Prosser explains that Brandeis and Warren’s article did not have an 
immediate effect upon the American legal, economic, and cultural landscapes: “For 
the next thirty years there was a continued dispute as to whether the right of 
privacy existed at all” (384-386).13 Prosser’s point is worth reiterating, because it 
illustrates that the dimensions of the private sphere of individualism were highly 
ambiguous and that the private’s relationship to the legal constitution of individual 
subjects was up for heated academic and popular debate across various legal, 
social, and cultural institutions from the late 1890s through the 1930s.14 During this 
time, in other words, privacy was becoming constitutive of personhood.
The idea of privacy emerged primarily in response to technologies of publicity 
—to protect individuals from invasions by “the too enterprising press, the photog­
rapher, or the possessor of any other modem device for recording or reproducing 
scenes or sounds” (Brandeis and Warren 206).15 It was a defensive principle de­
signed to provide refuge from the modem world and its “unseemly gossip”:
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The intensity and complexity o f life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have 
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining 
influence o f culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and 
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modem enterprise and 
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain 
and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. (196)
The principle defended not just domestic possessions and corporeal private space, 
but “the thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of 
writing or of the arts” as well as “the personal appearance, sayings, acts and . . . 
personal relation[s] domestic or otherwise” of an individual person—thereby ren­
dering the social exogenous to a very wide range of practices legally cordoned off 
as “the personal” (205,213). All such personal attributes and behaviors, Brandeis 
and Warren argued, are “instance[s] of the enforcement of the more general right of 
the individual to be let alone” (205):
It is like the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the 
right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be defamed. In each o f these 
rights, as indeed in all other rights recognized by the law, there inheres the quality 
o f being owned or possessed— and (as that is the distinguishing attribute o f prop­
erty) there may be some propriety in speaking o f those rights as property. But, 
obviously, they bear little resemblance to what is ordinarily comprehended under 
that term. The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal 
productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication 
in any form, is in reality not the principle o f private property, but that o f an 
inviolate personality. (205)
Brandeis and Warren understood the right to privacy to be “a part of the more 
general right to the immunity of the person—the right to one’s personality” (207). 
This “extended and unusual sense” of property legally defined the individual per­
son as a private space, a bounded personality requiring its own legislation, polic­
ing, and protection.
If the emergence of the legal principle of privacy was a reaction to intruding 
technologies of the public, the values that came to be associated with the private 
sphere also emerged in response to what Robert Wiebe describes as the function­
alism of the public sphere in the early twentieth century. Providing a very clear 
analysis of the professionalization and the systematization of public spaces and 
institutions, he argues that, “[a]rriving around 1900 and gaining momentum after 
1910, the bureaucratic orientation did not reach its peak of success until the nine­
teen twenties” (149). I want to expand and revise Wiebe’s claims that bureaucratic 
society “obliterated the inner man” (148). Indeed, within bureaucratic frameworks, 
“the focus had shifted from essences to actions,” and “the new ideas concerned 
what men were doing and how they did it” (148). But the rationalization of political, 
social, and educational institutions in public led precisely to an intensification of 
something called the “inner life” in private.16 As bureaucratic efficiency increas­
ingly characterized social institutions, the intimate sphere functionally and spa­
tially separated and protected the “human” side of life; it was where the person was
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cultivated and made whole. To sum up, if Wiebe is right, and the rhetoric of 
functionalism reached its peak in the 1920s, the function of the private spaces of 
domesticity and personhood, in turn, was to house those qualities that were not 
oriented toward bureaucratic efficiency—to protect the inner self.
During these first two decades, the inner self became thoroughly pop-psy- 
chologized. And, predictably, it gathered enormous attention as a target of the 
advertising industry, a trend that distinguishes twentieth-century advertising from 
earlier practices, according to design historians Ellen Lupton and J. Abbott Miller: 
“By 1900 the notion of advertising as a benevolent advertising information service 
gave way to more aggressive and sophisticated strategies. Pamphlets, lectures, 
and articles on ‘advertising psychology’ appeared as early as 1896” (184). Text­
books such as Walter Dill Scott’s The Theory o f Advertising and The Psychology of 
Advertising emphasized advertising’s power of suggestion and defined the con­
sumer in a new way: as a manipulable subject motivated not by reason, but by 
impulsive desires. A new field called “market research” appeared, and along with it, 
what I am calling the psychologization of separate spheres, the mystification of 
social normative gender categories as psychological. “J. Walter Thompson, then 
one of the largest firms in the country, added, in 1919, a statistical and investigation 
department and two planning departments—one for male and one for female con­
sumers” (187). Armed with experts’ knowledge from this departmental structure of 
separate spheres, advertisers played upon the insecurities and desires of their 
target markets; for example, “fear was frequently turned to the advantage of busi­
ness through advertisements that played upon the insecurities of women as inad­
equate dates, wives, mothers, or housekeepers” (187).
It is not difficult to make the transition from the convergence of the pseudo­
scientific psychologization of the inner self with the mechanisms of the market to 
this period’s overwhelming preoccupations with identity, especially sexual iden­
tity. Indeed, it is impossible to fully understand early twentieth-century working 
concepts of identity without also taking into consideration prevailing attitudes to­
wards sexual difference, or deviance, as it were. On the one hand, the self was 
conceived as a depth that escaped social systematization. But on the other, the self 
became a bound interiority that could, in the interests of the social (sexual) order, 
be contained—a privatized enclosure to be named and identified, its boundaries 
regulated accordingly. The definition of sexuality radically shifted at this time— 
from outer-directed behaviors and desires to identity, a personal trait to be uncov­
ered through a close hermeneutic reading of the subject. With the relocation of 
sexuality to the insides of body, it became the private property of atomized sub­
jects, hidden, but retrievable if necessary, and subject to discipline if not properly 
maintained.17 Anti-obscenity campaigns and vice crusaders reigned, rigorously 
legislating boundaries around proper expressions of sexuality. Already ripe with 
the research of sexologists attracting a wide range of the population, this period 
marked the advent of pathologized and “deviant” sexualities on an institutional 
scale. The same sexual advice literature advocating self-government and individual 
management of one’s own borders and surfaces called for the establishment of 
external regulations for those who couldn’t control themselves.18
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Three: Counterprivates
The actual alternative to the received and produced fixed forms is not silence: not 
the absence, the unconscious, which bourgeois culture has mythicized. It is a kind 
o f feeling and thinking which is indeed social and material, but in an embryonic 
phase before it can become fully articulated and defined exchange. Its relations 
with the already articulated and defined are then exceptionally complex.
— Raymond Williams
My concerns about models of defensive enclosure are driven, in large part, by 
contemporary legislations of social bodies and spaces that privatize housing and 
subjectivity in the face of intimate relations between people who don’t adhere to 
the heterosexual couple formation or the detached nuclear family. The policing of 
public sexual culture at the center of the 42nd Street Development Project in New 
York City over the last few years reminds me that the deconstruction of dominant 
social structures is emphatically not an outdated critical activity.19 As I study the 
impact of domestic form on subjectivity, I think about particular ways that sexual 
difference and orientation, as well as skin color and economic class, get figured into 
or out of contemporaiy models of dwelling. If there is a sense of urgency fueling my 
analyses of the forces of privatization which have been cleansing public spaces, 
policing bodies, and fueling narrow-minded educational policies for almost ten 
decades, however, I am at the same time acutely aware of the need to analyze and 
reposition these forces as one set of multiple factors contributing to the multiple 
and intersecting layers of social relations and landscapes that coexisted in the early 
twentieth century. An emerging opposition between a social sphere and an inti­
mate one at the turn of the twentieth century speaks to a state of acute vulnerability. 
But not everyone felt the need to secure a personal space away from the social 
world. While divisions between the home and the marketplace, between private 
realms and public spheres, did and still do order a significant portion of the Ameri­
can landscape, there existed other modes of dwelling and practices of subjectivity 
that did not take such predictable forms.
If Jeffrey Masten asks, “How will we read, interpret, conceptualize, organize, 
and edit texts written before the birth of the author in its modem (self-possessed 
and sexually orientated) incarnation” (9), I am asking: How might we read, inter­
pret, conceptualize, organize, and edit spaces designed and texts composed in the 
early twentieth century that don’t fit this self-possessive framework? Rather than 
engage the still valuable work of deconstruction or reiterate the various problems 
with the dominant ideologies of privacy, the remaining pages of this essay seek to 
develop a language through which other modes of inhabitation that existed along­
side defensive enclosures may be better understood. I resist framing these alterna­
tive spatialities as exceptions or even reactions to the rule. Instead, I am trying to 
find the tools with which we might positively explore other(ed) spaces—to dis­
cover what they do rather than what they don’t do.
I take very seriously Eve Sedgwick’s warnings about paranoid reading. 
Sedgwick explains that the “paranoid critical stance” has become “nearly synony­
mous with criticism itself’ (4): “Subversive and demystifying parody, suspicious
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archaeologies of the present, the detection of hidden patterns of violence and their 
exposure . . . these teachable protocols of unveiling have become the common 
currency of cultural and historicist studies” (21). Operating according to a false 
consciousness model, the paranoid critic assumes that her job is to decipher, to 
expose dominant power relations that structure any given site (for Sedgwick, the 
site in question is the literary text; I am here concerned more broadly with material 
and textual practices of domestic interiority). The problem with this widespread 
critical habit is that while such a practice can expertly reveal how certain social 
systems operate to constrain, it simply cannot see how those same systems might 
enable and, moreover, it is largely blind to other relations that may be shaping the 
site. Furthermore, the demystification of power structures may not contribute so 
much after all to their actual dissolution. Placing all “faith in exposure,” Sedgwick 
argues, the paranoid critic acts “as though to make something visible as a problem 
were, if not a mere hop, skip, and jump away from getting it solved, at least self- 
evidently a step in that direction” (17). Nowadays though, most everyone knows in 
their popular cynicism that ideologies are contradictory; even the media likes to 
laugh at the artificiality of gender representations. So “what is the basis for assum­
ing that it will surprise or disturb—never mind motivate—anyone to learn that a 
given social manifestation is artificial, self-contradictory, imitative, phantasmatic, 
or even violent?” (19). Drawing upon the work of Melanie Klein and Silvan 
Tomkins, Sedgwick wants to make space for what she calls reparative reading prac­
tices—“methodologically adventurous” ways of reading (3) that are “more inter­
esting, more responsive, more truthful, and more useful as we try to account for 
[our work’s] motives in a less stylized fashion than we have been” (23). Reparative 
readers acknowledge the realities of oppression without fixing them. They explore 
“the extremely varied, dynamic, and historically contingent ways that strong theo­
retical constructs interact with weak ones in the ecology of knowing” (23), and they 
look closely for relations and desires in texts that have “not (yet?) resolved into a 
sexual specificity of proscribed object choice, aim, site, or identification” (2). “To 
read from a reparative position is to surrender the knowing, anxious paranoid deter­
mination that no horror, however apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to the 
reader as new: to a reparatively positioned reader it can seem realistic and neces­
sary to experience surprise. Because there can be terrible surprises, however, there 
can also be good ones” (24). The possibility of other worlds drives the reparative 
reader, not the inevitability of the present ones. Reparative reading is not meant to 
replace paranoid criticism as I understand it. It is a mode of thinking, reading, and 
writing that deserves to take up adjacent and complementary spaces in our schol­
arship and teaching.
I offer the term counterprivate to critically complement two recent trends in 
architecture and social theory, which are themselves reparatively driven by the 
possibility of other words, alternatives to past and present mappings of domestic­
ity, privacy, and the public. First, the unprivate house, the central figure of the
1999 Museum of Modem Art exhibition curated by Terence Riley, challenges con­
ventional private dwellings by highlighting the permeability of their boundaries 
and/or undoing them. The exhibition praises the “unsentimental pose[s]” of
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unprivate houses spanning the twentieth century for the way they expose, in their 
formal arrangement and design, objects and practices that are usually kept private 
(26). In the accompanying narrative, Riley suggests that in the age of digital media 
and public exhibitionism, “the splendid isolation envisioned by [Frank Lloyd] 
Wright” may be outdated, that these unprivate houses offer a progressive alterna­
tive to the intimacy—publicity dichotomy (17). As the framing figure suggests, 
however, the exhibition does not seek an alternative state of being at home, what­
ever that may mean. The house is either private in the conventional sense or it is 
slyly, playfully, or cynically deconstructed and turned inside out.
Second, the counterpublic sphere so central to recent queer public sphere criti­
cism practiced by Berlant and Warner, among others. This is the place where 
affects, behaviors, and attachments dwell in neither “the official publics of opinion 
culture and the state” nor “the privatized forms normally associated with sexuality” 
(322). It is the site for non-normative intimacies that aren’t allowed in public space 
“proper” (which, as Berlant points out, is actually constituted by “simultaneously 
lived private worlds” [Queen 5]) and that certainly won’t settle for the predictable 
formations of the “inside.” Because private residences for normative sexual rela­
tions and citizenship have increasingly replaced more diverse public cultures, Berlant 
and Warner argue, it is central to queer culture to make public other “kinds of 
intimacy that bear no necessary relation to domestic space, to kinship, to the couple 
form, to property, or to the nation” (322). A counterpublic in this sense is always 
unstable, “an indefinitely accessible world conscious of its subordinate relation” 
to the existing arrangement of private and the public spheres (322), but rich with 
transformative, “collective world making” energies (Warner, Publics 57). Gestures, 
encounters, and collaborations that have no canon, more ephemeral productions in 
social space and in print culture, connections between people who are for various 
reasons not visible as a community or an identity, mobile sites that are not sup­
ported by dominant architectures of domesticity—these have the potential to pro­
duce other spatialities.
Counterpublic criticism has much in common with Raymond Williams’s work 
around what he calls “structures of feeling.” The movement through and beyond 
the subject positions made visible by institutional discourses is the movement 
between what Williams describes as “the ruling definition of the social,” on the one 
hand, and that which, through the processes of exclusion, “may often be seen as 
the personal or the private” (125). He interrogates the common-sense world as 
composed of various modes of spatiality that are not all organized in terms of 
dominant discursive categories. Structures of feeling, in so far as they exist be­
neath the level of the concept, pose the possibility of oppositional practices to the 
dominant culture. The dominant is never all-encompassing: “No dominant social 
order and therefore no dominant culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all 
human practice, human energy and human intention” (125). That which is desig­
nated as the personal and private, the self and the body, can be sites of resistance. 
The stutterings and the slippages, the bodily gestures gone awry, the missed com­
munications, the unexpected points of contact. . .  they often fall between the cracks 
of dominant social norms. But unless the dominant discourse’s gaps and fissures
Blaustein 53
are publicized, that is to say, unless the dimensions of the self and the body are 
conceptualized as public products of social relations rather than bounded interior 
personalized spaces, such normative representations will not be challenged to the 
extent that they should be. It is important to depersonalize structures of feeling, to 
get them out into the open, to break them out of their contained spaces.
Whether they concern the complex processes involved in the consolidation of 
boundaries around the private or the opposites, failures, leaks, and loose ends of 
such consolidations, much contemporary literary and social criticism frames the 
private as a site to be demystified, exposed, questioned, deconstructed—a repressed, 
stifling, “obnoxiously cramped” space from which progressive social criticism must 
run, a bourgeois trap, an effect of bad ideology (Warner, Publics 194). In Warner’s 
Publics and Counterpublics, for example, the term is almost always used in con­
junction with regressive conceptions of identity based upon the fiction of some 
kind of pre-social stable ground for the self (see 208). He critiques the current 
conditions of the private self, privacy as a product of “heteronormative conven­
tions of intimacy,” which
conjure a mirage: a home base o f pre-political humanity from which citizens are 
thought to come into political discourse and to which they are expected to return 
in the (always imaginary) future after political conflict. Intimate life . . .  is the 
endlessly cited elsewhere o f political public discourse, a promised haven that 
distracts citizens from the unequal conditions of their political and economic lives, 
consoles them for the damaged humanity o f mass society, and shames them for 
any divergence between their lives and the intimate sphere that is alleged to be 
simple personhood. (193)
If this is clearly a limited (when not utterly disabling) formation of the private, I am 
wondering if there is a private to be differently imagined with respect to complex 
personhood? How might the private be conceived within alternative contexts for 
living? Are there privates that are attendant to the more flexible indexes for social 
membership collectively constructed by counterpublics?
As we seek to articulate affects and relations that exist outside the bounds of 
normative privacies, I wonder whether it might be useful to wander back into less 
predictable formations of the inside, architectures of intimacy that do not merely 
support or reinforce standard forms of intimacy, models of individualism that are 
committed to making space for an inner life but not defensively detached from 
outerworlds. Counterprivates run contrary to the “right” course. They offset (as 
in counterattack), reject (as in counterculture), or thwart the efforts of (as in coun­
terintelligence) dominant ideologies of privacy. They exist simultaneously with so- 
called established privates but move in an opposite direction—not opposite from 
the public, but opposite from the kind of private stuck in that dichotomous relation­
ship with the public. The always shifting morphologies of the counterprivate are 
profoundly un-sum-up-able, but they will likely share at least three major aspects:
1) relative autonomy from what is understood to be the “public,” 2) a non-defensive 
posture towards this “public,” and 3) non-identitarian attachments or relations to 
the self.
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First, while never forgetting that the dimensions of the private space of the 
house and of the person have everything to do with the social coordinates which 
plot work, leisure, romance, gender, and sexuality, I am concerned to disarticulate 
counterprivates from social institutions—to insist on a connected but non-neces­
sary relationship between certain formations of the private and normative struc­
tures. In response to some feminist theorists’ fears “that attention to the surface 
and the outside denies the affectivity of interiority,” Elspeth Probyn argues that we 
should be careful not to oppose interiority to social construction (12).20 It makes 
more sense, she explains, to investigate fctthe forces which constitute the outside 
and the inside as dichotomous” (12). But if interiority is always socially consti­
tuted, are all interiorities stuck within this socially constituted dichotomous rela­
tionship? That is to say, are there insides that are not the opposites or the other 
sides of outsides?
Take, for example, T. J. Jackson Lears’s now classic analysis of the coalescence 
of architectural and subjective interiority for the late nineteenth- and early twenti- 
eth-century middle classes. Lears argues that the turn of the century domestic 
interior, “increasingly called upon to harbor all the emotional warmth and intimacy 
that had been banished from the calculating world outside” (5), turned into a 
hyperpersonalized escapist haven, “an arena for exotic performance and theatrical 
illusion” (7), “an essential refuge for cultivating personal identity” that was only 
apparently
 set off from the modem technological and commercial world (14). Both 
the self and home became “theatre[s] for performance,” their stage sets furnished 
“with high-style consumer goods” (14): “The sanctioned way to foster these illu­
sions was by purchasing and assembling mass-marketed commodities so that the 
interior might harbor a more fluid self, adrift amid the objects of its fantasies” (7). 
Lears sets up a strong dichotomy between the commodity-obsessed consumers 
duped by the market into endlessly remaking themselves, “unstable selves who try 
to solidify their existence through high-style consumption,” and the core interior 
authentic selves longed for by many a modernist writer (15). But is there a third 
space between or alongside a commodified self and an imagined core interior self? 
Are all subjects trying to solidify their existences? Is there a performative interior­
ity to endlessly developing selves that is not slave to the market, that can be 
granted some degree of critical autonomy?
Second, the private need not be a defensive space of refuge or resistance. The 
point here is not to discount the importance of “the home as a place of security” and 
“the confidence in the house as providing shelter and security” (Rainwater 93- 
94).21 Sociologist Lee Rainwater finds that the more threatening the social environ­
ment, the more acute the longing for a boundary that designates a necessarily 
defensive domestic interiority. His analysis serves as a much-needed reminder that 
blurry, heterogeneous spaces cannot be treated as categorically positive, but it 
also reveals the dominance of a middle-class ideal of privacy that suppresses other 
kinds of valuable interactions. The only available solution to unsafe living arrange­
ments, in other words, seems to be the middle-class suburban dwelling legislated 
by a neighborhood association that deals with social problems. Moving up the 
socio-economic ladder, so to speak, means that safe common spaces that are ere-
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ated in higher-risk neighborhoods—semi-private outdoor spaces and common in­
door spaces, like the hallway shared by multiple families—disappear in favor of 
detached dwelling. And interactions between “families” become less and less 
spontaneous.22
Barry Schwartz similarly points out the important functions of privacy in the 
struggle for individuality, especially in oppressive situations in which the ego 
needs to put up defenses: “Privacy prevents the ego from identifying itself too 
closely with or losing itself in (public) roles” (136). Likewise, Erving Goffinan 
provides a provocative analysis of “the practice of reserving something of oneself 
from the clutch of an institution” (319). He argues that “this recalcitrance is not an 
incidental mechanism of defense but rather an essential constituent of the self’
(319). In any social organization, an individual “employ[s] methods to keep some 
distance, some elbow room between himself and that which others assume he 
should be identified” (319). Goffinan’s articulation of the self as a “stance-taking 
entity, a something that takes up a position somewhere between identification with 
an organization and opposition to it, and is ready at the slightest pressure to regain 
its balance by shifting its involvement in either direction” is, largely, a defense 
model of individualism: “It is thus against something that the self can emerge”
(320). But his own question—“If we find then, that in all situations actually studied 
the participant has erected defenses against his social bondedness, why should we 
base our conceptions of the self upon how the individual would act were condi­
tions ‘just right’?”— suggests that a reconceptualization of the self might begin to 
understand such distancing, reservation, and recalcitrance as something other 
than defensive; in other words, it may be possible to reframe this residue of selfhood 
that doesn’t slot smoothly into given social categories of organization (that “often 
resides in the cracks” of “the solid buildings of the world”) in its positivity and 
moreover, as Goffinan articulates so well, as a practice (320).
It follows, then, that defensiveness should be understood as a temporary, 
situational, and symptomatic state, not a foundational quality of privacy. Under 
better circumstances, the private can be created and inhabited as a non-defensive 
interiority, a “free space,” to use the phenomenological language of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, which allows embodied subjects to carry out their own projects in 
the world, to act in and on their surroundings (see 98-147). Merleau-Ponty’s “free 
space” is no doubt utopian in the sense that social norms operate otherwise. Politi­
cal theorist and philosopher Iris Marion Young, for example, brilliantly articulates 
the effects of oppressive gender norms as precisely the felt corporeal and psycho­
logical constriction of such “free space.” For many women, she explains, “a space 
surrounds us in imagination that we are not free to move beyond; the space avail­
able to our movement is a constricted space” (146). She also adds that “the space 
that is physically available to the feminine body is frequently of greater radius than 
the space that she uses and inhabits” (151). In other words, when a subject is 
oppressed as a body by social norms of femininity her space as a free subject 
sometimes seems to start inside her skin—the surface of the body felt to be a social 
ground—and the body is experienced as an enclosure. Far from a social privilege, 
this interiority is experienced as an effect of social norms that frame or inscribe a
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subject along its corporeal boundaries. It is this kind of interiority, as I understand 
it, that becomes the object of various anti-racist, feminist, and queer critiques of 
essentialist philosophies and politics that are structured around a logic of identity 
that makes claims about what people are. In this sense, the subject-as-enclosure 
more accurately serves as an indicator of an oppressed social subject rather than a 
descriptor of empowered selfhood.
Third, the private need not bind to the self as a protective or stabilizing appa­
ratus of personality or identity. Young’s recommendation that “political theory 
would do well to disengage social group difference from a logic of identity” affects 
not only conceptualizations of the political, public culture, and social justice; it 
profoundly concerns theories of the private (82). For in order to “conceptualize 
social groups according to a relational rather than a substantialist logic” and affirm 
that “groups do not have identities as such, but rather that individuals construct 
their own identities on the basis of social group positioning,” the private forms of 
citizenship upon which contemporary American political rhetoric and policy are 
based clearly need to be dismantled and reconceived (82). Counterprivates sup­
port a form of individualism based upon a freedom that is not substantive, that is 
less a characteristic or descriptor of being than a condition for action. They bear a 
non-identitarian relation to the self, enabling—but neither containing nor express­
ing—dimensions of subjectivity and domesticity conventionally understood to be 
private and personal. As frames for private transformation, they have boundaries 
that articulate permeable and connected spheres of flexible use and creative inhabi­
tation, zones that are not defined by any fixed content (emotions, secrets, nuclear 
family, skeletons, monogamous sex) or set of properties (pitched roof, four walls, 
family feel, ethnic background, heterosexual orientation, distance from neighbor), 
but by how they functionP To borrow from legal scholar Patricia Williams’s 
reconceptualization of legal rights, they are flexible states of inwardness wherein 
“privacy is turned from exclusion based on self-regard into regard for another’s 
fragile, mysterious autonomy” (92). Counterprivates move away from a model of 
interiority whereby idiosyncrasies, differences, and failures reside inside each ato­
mistic and disconnected “house of rights,” embracing instead the profound irre- 
ducibility of the adjacent other. And they respect the ungraspable perplexities of 
the self, what Marcel Proust beautifully renders in the following passage as the 
non-ego inhabiting the most intimate of places:
I leave it to people o f taste to make o f their rooms the very image o f their taste, and 
to fill them only with things o f which they can approve. As for me, I feel myself 
living and thinking in a room where everything is the creation and the language o f  
lives profoundly different from mine, o f a taste opposite to mine, where I find 
nothing o f my conscious thought, where my imagination is excited by feeling itself 
plunged into the depths of the non-ego. . .  where in the evening, when opening the 
door o f one’s room, one has the feeling o f violating all o f  the life that has remained 
scattered there, o f taking it boldly by the hand when, once the door is closed, one 
enters farther, up to the table or the window; to sit with it in a kind o f  free 
promiscuousness on the sofa designed by the upholsterer o f the local county in 
what he believed to be the style o f Paris; to touch everywhere the nakedness o f
Blaustein 57
that life with the intention o f being troubled by one’s own familiarity, by putting 
here and there one’s things, by pretending to be the master o f that room full to the 
brim with the soul o f others and which keeps even in the shape o f its andirons and 
the pattern o f its curtains the imprint o f their dreams, by walking barefoot on its 
unknown carpet; one has then the feeling o f shutting in with oneself this secret life, 
when one goes, all trembling, to bolt the door; o f pushing it in front of one onto the 
bed and finally lying down with it under the large white sheets which come up over 
one’s fa c e___ (17, 19)
One’s own strangers in residence are not ghostly invasions of the homely that need 
to be expelled. They constitute a precious and generative unfamiliarity that is a 
welcome not a threat to a self utterly vulnerable to its outsides.
In conclusion, there are two broad goals motivating my wide-eyed and open- 
ended appeals for counterprivates: to rethink the suburban model of interiority 
upon which many a household of the self is based and to rearrange the domestic 
itself so that the house might not figure as a stabilizing ground for subjectivity. If 
a site so intimately linked to narratives of identity and belonging is to be a practic­
ing place productively linked to the social world, it can be secure without being a 
static foundation for the fiction of pre-social selves. As so many developments in 
architecture and urban planning, legal and political frameworks of liberalism, and 
literary and educational discourses around the text still tightly entangle the priva­
tized domestic and the subject, whereby one is assumed to contain and express the 
other, it seems like a pressingly good time to not merely unhouse the subject, but 
set up some new digs.
Notes
1 For example, Frank Alvah Parsons writes: “The house is but the externalized man;
himself expressed in colour, form, line, and texture___It is he” (vii). A browse through any
issue o f The Craftsman from this period also demonstrates multiple variations o f this 
pattern. For the explicitly gendered aspects o f such conflations, whereby the female body 
is aligned with the domestic interior, see Post 200; de Wolfe 5 ,18 ,21; Burbank xi; Gordon.
2 For a very dense investigation o f different historically-situated relations between 
family structures and civic life and an argument against neoconservatives and liberal human­
ists’ assumptions o f a natural relation between the two, see Shapiro.
3 For excellent histories o f commercialized sex from the mid-nineteenth to the twentieth 
century, see D ’Emilio and Freedman; Erenberg; Kasson; Gilfoyle; Mumford; Peiss.
4 George Chauncey charts a “gay life . . .  more integrated into the everyday life o f the 
city in the prewar decades than it would be after World War II” (3). Chauncey convincingly 
argues that the urban landscapes o f sexual culture before 1940 were not subject to a strictly 
binary framework o f sexual identity. The most visible gay worlds, he claims, were grounded 
in working-class cultures where the labels “homo” and “hetero” were not dominant until the 
middle o f the twentieth century.
5 For an excellent analysis o f Wright’s middle-class conventions and clientele, see 
Twombly.
6 Oddly enough, Hoover resided at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City. For a more 
detailed explanation o f Hoover’s influence, see Wright, Building the Dream 193-214. 
Gwendolyn Wright also discusses the 1922 Better Homes in America Movement, the more
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explicitly commercial arm of this effort. For an overview o f late nineteenth-century defen­
sive domesticities, see Sennett; Warner, Streetcar Suburbs.
7 The first zoning ordinance was passed in Los Angeles in 1909, and New York estab­
lished land use regulations in 1916, but it was not until the 1920s, when smaller cities and 
suburbs adopting zoning regulations, that they had the biggest impact (Wright, Building the 
Dream 213). See also McKenzie 299-301; U.S. Department of Commerce.
8 Motor vehicle registration doubled between 1920 and 1930, from 9 million to 20 
million (Wright, Building the Dream 207; Historical Statistics 223). As president, Hoover 
held a conference in 1931 advocating single-family home ownership, which led to the devel­
opment o f 50 million homes housing three quarters o f American families (see Gries and Ford; 
Hayden 9-10). The overproduction o f single-family dwellings, in fact, produced a crisis 
during the years leading up to the Depression, when thousands o f these houses were left 
unoccupied because they were too expensive (“Mass-produced Houses”). Since the De­
pression, Gwendolyn Wright points out, “housing in the United States has been circum­
scribed by federal guidelines . . . .  The government has set standards for construction, for 
financing, for land-use planning, and, to a certain extent, for family and community life” 
(218). Wright also points out that after World War II, the federal government actively 
promoted widespread building o f suburban developments, slum clearance, urban renewal 
programs, and the building o f highways— all o f which deeply segregated American commu­
nities, most o f them explicitly so (220-239).
9 The is part o f Wright’s nationalist project. Complaining o f Americans’ tendencies to 
copy other civilizations rather than produce their own “originals,” o f the American “habit to 
fashion appearances rapidly into a nation-wide cult in lieu o f genuine culture,” o f the 
commodification o f “America’s own nature,” he puts forth this call for regionalism:
Why not then, take hold ourselves o f  this interior native content awaiting deliver­
ance in our Culture in our own minority report and ourselves gradually build with it a 
Nation where no commodity can hope for success except as it contributes not only to 
the ease and wealth o f  the Nation, but contributes as well to the integrity o f  the 
Nation considered as created for the spirit o f  Man— not merely for men. (“Prospec­
tus” 2-3)
10 From the very beginning o f the practice o f architecture in the United States, domestic 
and public architecture were treated differently— not just programmatically, o f  course, but 
stylistically. At the end o f the eighteenth century, Thomas Jefferson built his private houses 
in the Palladian style and reserved Classicism for public buildings. It is important to point 
out that the difference between inner-city architecture and suburban architecture wasn’t just 
one o f taste or security— it had everything to do with the institution o f architectural educa­
tion at this time. In the second half o f the nineteenth century, it was understood that the best 
American architectural students (Louis Sullivan, Richard Morris Hunt, Henry Hobson 
Richardson, and Charles McKim, to name just a few) went to Paris to study at the Ecole des 
Beaux-Arts,
which exercised a strong influence on recently established schools o f  architecture in 
America, and where for several decades Americans were in a majority among overseas 
students . . . .  As this relationship grew in the second half o f  the nineteenth century, 
so inner-city architecture in America came increasingly under the influence o f  the 
Ecole des Beaux-Arts, whilst in the suburbs and in the countryside autonomous devel­
opments continued. (Kruft 345-355)
11 For a variety o f disciplinary approaches to the study o f the front lawn as an exten­
sion o f the domestic facade, see Jenkins; Teyssot; Diller.
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12 Each individual family unit received an acre in Frank Lloyd Wright’s various utopian 
schemes. All plans were decentralized to avoid the social and moral problems he considered 
endemic to overcrowded cities. Broadacre City, for example, was designed as a series o f  
largely self-subsistent homesteads for the average five-person nuclear family. Early plans 
included only detached houses for residences. A later tract accommodated apartment build­
ings and hotel facilities, but only on the outskirts o f the City, beyond a waterway which 
served as a barrier between the residential and industrial zones. See Wright, The Disappear­
ing City, When Democracy Builds, The Living City. For a critique o f Broadacre City’s 
pseudo-cooperative organization, see Zellman and Friedland.
13 Prosser’s article is both a historical review o f the right to privacy and an analysis o f 
its separate components (freedom from intrusion, public disclosure o f private facts, misrep­
resentation in public, wrongful appropriation of identity) as we have come to understand the 
principle today (389). For a thorough list o f early twentieth-centuiy law review discussions 
o f the right to privacy, see Prosser 384n.
14 Over the course o f at least two or three centuries, intense dialogue and debate over the 
creation and definition o f private property can be found with respect to copyright laws and 
practices. Here, I am concerned with the private property that becomes synonymous with 
personhood in the early twentieth century.
15 The larger story here concerns the commodification o f privacy, made possible by new 
technologies such as the camera. It is not a unidirectional movement from the public into the 
private. The private, in many cases, makes itself available for public consumption. Roland 
Barthes says it best in the following passage: “The age o f photography corresponds pre­
cisely to the explosion o f the private into the public . . .  or rather into the creation o f a new 
social value, which is the publicity o f the private: the private is consumed as such, publicly” 
(98).
16 This is, o f course, not an original claim. Georg Simmel famously described the split 
metropolitan type at the turn o f the twentieth century in his 1903 essay “The Metropolis 
and Mental Life.”
17 For an excellent overview o f the pathologization o f non-normative sexual practices in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see D ’Emilio and Freedman 171-235.
18 Andrea Friedman begins her study o f Comstock’s reign with the 1909 establishment 
o f the National Board o f  Censorship o f Motion Pictures, “a New York based organization 
that offered the first institutional articulation o f the principles underlying democratic moral 
authority” (21). According to Friedman, sexual materials and expressions were judged not 
only by their purportedly “indecent” content, but by their potential to elicit “indecent” 
responses (i.e., lust, arousal, deviant thoughts and behaviors) from their readers or viewers 
(17). She explains that this “dual emphasis. . .  made possible the successful prosecution o f  
serious works o f social criticism, sex education tracts, advertisements for contraceptives, 
and outright pornography alike” (17). The Comstock laws deemed most expressions o f  
sexuality “outside” the private domestic sphere indecent, immoral, and obscene; sexuality 
was not allowed to take up social space.
19 For provocatively different takes on the redevelopment o f 42nd Street, see Delaney. 
For a multi-pronged response to contemporary conservative sex education agendas and for 
links to organizations that act out against the systematic policing and purification o f public 
space, see also Managing Desire. In one o f the best pieces I’ve encountered on the complex 
moral and financial forces behind zoning laws, Alison Redick argues that the Redevelopment 
Project under Mayor Rudy Guiliani’s reign can be traced back to vice campaigns in the 1920s 
and 430s that targeted brothels and saloons. For similar work, see Dangerous Bedfellows.
20 Biddy Martin, for example, argues that “too exclusive an understanding of psychic 
life as the effect o f normalization can impoverish the language we have available for thinking
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about selves and relationships, even as they apparently enrich our vocabularies for thinking 
about social construction” (106).
21 Rainwater’s analysis points to the class-specificity o f the concept o f the house as an 
expression o f the self. Lower classes, he explains, may exist in tension with their homes, and 
he argues that only after “the battle to make the home a safe place has long been won” does 
the home have “more central to its definition other functions which have to do with self- 
expression and self-realization” (93).
22 On the importance of semi-public spaces to working- and lower-class families, see 
Yancey.
23 Because the primary aim of this essay is to develop the historical and theoretical 
framework for counter-formulations o f private dwelling, I have chosen to leave out analy­
ses o f specific past and contemporary architectures that I believe productively engage in 
counterprivate practices o f the self and home. Such work, o f course, falls into the broader 
scope o f this project. Here, I will mention just two o f several possible architects who may 
be preoccupied with shaping private spheres o f flexible use and creative inhabitation. First, 
Rudolph M. Schindler conceived o f his houses, especially his own 1921-1922 Kings Road 
House, as profoundly permeable “frames for living.” The text accompanying a recent major 
exhibition, The Architecture ofR M. Schindler, serves as an excellent introduction to Schindler’s 
philosophy and work. Second and more recently, Lebbeus Woods’s philosophies and 
materializations o f “free-zones”— experimental architectures of indeterminacy for “a type 
o f free interaction— a dialogue with oneself’ (15)— strongly parallel my descriptions o f  the 
counterprivate.
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